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Introduction :  
India has pursed a policy of economic growth with technological self-reliance right 
through the 1950s when she embarked on a planned form of development. Two industries 
that were targeted especially was the manufacturing of drugs and telecommunications 
equipments. However the final outcomes have been very different. The drug industry has 
become self sufficient, has emerged as net exporter and has a strong patenting record 
abroad while the telecommunications industry has increasingly become dependent on 
MNCs and imports and the industry does not have many p tents to boast of. I argue that 
although the broad external environments obtaining to both industries are roughly similar, 
the differences in outcomes could be explained by the differences in their sectoral 
systems of innovation (SSI). The SSI of the pharmaceuti al industry presents an ideal 
picture where private sector business enterprises occupy the central stage. They have 
been supported very well by a conducive intellectual property regime, which enabled 
them to reverse engineer known technologies, and thereby emerge as incremental 
innovators. On the contrary, a public laboratory dominates the SSI of the telecoms 
industry and the production enterprises in the system did not have much innovation 
capability: the enterprises were completely dependent on the public laboratory. The 
government too did not support the laboratory adequately and very often the public 
technology procurement- the main instrument pursued by the state supposedly to support 
domestic technology generation through the laboratory was actually against it. 
Consequently most of the enterprises constituting the SSI of the telecoms industry have 
become mere traders- distributing products manufactred elsewhere. The analysis thus 
brings out important but practical policy prescriptions.  
 
The paper is structured into four sections. Section 1 will outline the framework for 
analysis, which is essentially the sectoral system of innovation propounded by Malerba 
(2004).The second section provides some numbers on the innovative performance of the 
two industries.   The third section undertakes a detailed mapping out of the sectoral 
system of innovation of two high tech in the Indian context, namely the pharmaceutical 
and telecom equipment industries. India’s pharmaceutical industry is one of the most 
innovative industries in the country’s manufacturing sector. The innovation system of the 
industry has three strong pillars: very pro active government policy regime especially 
with respect to intellectual property right, strong government research institutes and 
private sector enterprises which have invested in innovation. The TRIPS compliance of 
the intellectual property right regime making it mand tory for pharmaceutical products to 
be patented has not reduced the innovation capability of the industry although it has not 
                                                
* In working out the ideas contained in this paper I have drawn freely from two of my earlier papers, 
namely Mani (2005) and Mani (2006).  
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made them work on R&D projects that may lead to the discovery of drugs for neglected 
diseases of the developing world. Although the innovati n system has the capability to 
develop new chemical entities the two main components of the innovation system, 
namely the enterprises and the Government Research Institutes does not appear to be 
having all the requisite capabilities to bring a new drug to the market. Although the state 
has been very proactive with respect to this industry, this is an area where public policy 
support is still required.  On the contrary in the case of the telecom equipment industry, 
India followed a very rigid policy of indigenous development of domestic technologies 
by establishing a stand-alone public laboratory that developed state-of-the-art switching 
technologies. These were then transferred to manufacturing enterprises in both public and 
private sectors. The enterprises themselves did not have any in-house R&D capability. 
The public laboratory was also not given any strategic direction, even though it was 
technologically speaking, very competent. Consequently the country, despite possessing 
good quality human resource was unable to keep pacewith changes in the technology 
frontier and the equipment industry has now become essentially dominated by affiliates 
of MNCs. and by imports. The fourth and last section c ntrasts the two SSIs within the 
same national system of innovation and draws out the policy implications.  
 
I. The framework of analysis  
    The paper adopts a Sectoral System of Innovation  (SSI) perspective introduced by 
Malerba (2004). The framework involves mapping out the boundaries of the innovation 
system in terms of the specific agencies of the government dealing with 
telecommunications development, the policy framework, the equipment suppliers, the 
service providers and the regulatory agency and tracking the knowledge flows between 
these various actors within the system. According to Malerba (2004), every sectoral 
system of innovation has at least three blocks: (i) knowledge, technological domain, and 
boundaries; (ii) actors, relationships and networks; and (iii) institutions. These three 
blocks may be elaborated as follows. First, knowledge plays a central role in innovation. 
It has to be absorbed by firms through their differential abilities accumulated over time. 
Knowledge differs across sectors in terms of domains. One knowledge domain refers to 
the specific scientific and technological fields at the base of innovative activities in a 
sector. The boundaries of sectoral systems are affected by knowledge base and 
technologies. Second, sectoral systems are composed of heterogeneous actors. Firms are 
the key actors in the generation, adoption, and use of new technologies. Actors also 
include users and suppliers who have different types of relationships with the innovating, 
producing or selling firms. Other types of agents in a sectoral system are non-firm 
organizations, government agencies, local authorities, and so on. In various ways, they 
support innovation, technological diffusion, and production by firms, but again their role 
greatly differs among sectoral systems. Third, in all sectoral systems, institutions play a 
major role in affecting the rate of technological change, the organization of innovative 
activity and performance.    Innovation greatly differs across sectors in terms of sources, 
actors, features, boundaries and organization.  
 
II. The innovative performance of India’s pharmaceutical and telecom industries 
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The pharmaceutical industry is more successful from the innovation point of view (Table 
1). Three indicators are used: (i) trade balance; (ii) R&D expenditure; and (iii) number of 
US patents granted.  
 
Table 1: Innovative performance of India’s Pharmaceutical and 
Telecommunications Equipment Industries 
 
































1990-91 304.1 42.13  -71.77 7.48 1  
1991-92 402.2 39.95  -130.38 7.41   
1992-93 248.5 38.88  -97.38 9.51   










1994-95 501.6 57.70  -212.70 8.63   
1995-96 
  
613.0 64.77  -206.42 11.29 1  
1996-97 916.2 75.02  -232.55 16.11 
 
  
1997-98 1068.8 77.36  -232.10 13.33 
 
1  
1998-99 1103.1 89.71 56* -293.40 17.36   
1999-20 1295.5  36 -276.06 18.02 2  
2000-01 1542.3  46 -378.02 23.45 2  
2001-02 1637.2  48 -897.25 22.22 4  
2002-03 2058.3  72 -749.50 23.36 7  
2003-04 2473.4  44   11  
 
Note: * Cumulative number of patents granted during 1995 through 1999 
Soutrce: Mani (2005); and Mani (2006)  
 
On all the three indicators, the pharmaceutical industry has done much better even though 
both the industries received more or less equal amounts of state support.  My argument is 
that the relative better performance of the pharmaceuti al industry is to a large extent 
may be explained in terms of its sectoral system of innovation. This is because if research 
is done by Universities and other government research institutes and if production is done 
by business enterprises then building a bridge betwe n the two is always a problem. As 
can be seen below the SSI of the pharmaceutical industry had at its centre stage actors 
like business enterprises, which had strong research nd innovative capability. On the 
contrary the SSI of the telecom equipment industry had its centre stage a public 
 4 
laboratory devoid from production. Consequently the firms could implement the 
technologies that they developed (perhaps through reverse engineering) more effectively. 
This hypothesis is tested by examining the details of the SSI of the two industries.   
 
III. The SSI of two Indian high tech industries 
 
(a) The Pharmaceutical industry  
 
The following figure (Figure 1) maps out the sectoral system of innovation of the phama 
industry. There are essentially five components to the sectoral system. In broad terms 
they are (i) Policy and strategic direction; (ii) The Intellectual Property Right Regime; 
(iii) Human resource development or the supply of scientists and engineers2; (iv) 
Technology generating sector; and (v) The manufacturing sector.  
 
The three important components of the SSI are: (i) the public policy support; (ii) the 
manufacturing enterprises primarily in the private sector; and (iii) Government Research 
Institutes (GRIs). We deal with each of these components in some detail below:  
 
(i) The public policy support 
 
The market conduct or behaviour of the pharmaceutical industry in the country is 
subjected to the following policy framework. These could be classified as:  
 
-Overall policy framework towards the development of pharmaceutical industry; 
-Intellectual Property Right or patent regulations; 
-Price regulations; and  
-Product and quality regulations.  
 
(a) Overall policy framework: The overall policy framework governing the industry up 
to this time has been the Indian Pharmaceutical Policy f 1994.This is because the new 
drugs policy formulated by the government in 2002 could not be implemented due to 
litigation involving it; hence the policy of 1994 still continues to be in force. The present 
Policy known as the Draft National Pharmaceuticals Policy, 20063 has been necessitated 
due to several developments that have taken place during the course of last few years as 
well as to address some of the major concerns as highlighted above. Price regulation of 
the essential medicines is an important component of this policy. However several other 
matters having a close bearing on the pharmaceuticals sector have also been included. 
Since the purpose of the present paper is to analyse the sectoral system of innovation of 
the Indian pharmaceutical industry, we will focus our attention only on those aspects of  
 
                                                
2 The areas are medicinal chemistry; combinatorial chemistry; Bioinformatics and structure based 
molecular modelling ,  Genomics and proteomics, Clinical pharmacology, and Regulatory toxicology.  
 
3 Department of Chemicals and Petrochemicals, http://chemicals.nic.in/npp_circulation_latest.pdf (accessed 













































Figure 1: Sectoral System of Innovation of the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry (c2006)   
Source: Own Compilation  
Policy and Strategic Direction  
  
Managed by the Department Chemicals and Petrochemicals and the Departme nt of Science and  
Technology (through the Pharmaceuticals Research and Development Support Fund) and the  
Department of Biotechnology.   
  
Licensing  of firms for permission to manufacture : Drug Controller General.   
  
Price Controls by Drug Prices Control Order - 95, admini stered by The National Pharmaceutical  
Pricing Authority.   
  
Overall policy framework : Pharmaceutical policy 2002. A new policy is on the anvil.   
  
Human Resource Development   
  
Apartment from the Universities and Pharmacy  
Colleges, The National Institute of Pha rmaceutical  
Education and Research (NIPER) has been set up  
by the Government of India as an institute of  
“national importance” to achieve excellence in  
pharmaceutical science and technologies, education  
and Training. Through this institute, Government  
end eavor will be to upgrade the standards of  
Pharmacy education and R & D. 
Technology Generating Sector   
  
•   Government Research Institutes   
Central Drug Research Institute (CDRI)   
Indian Institute of Chemical Technology (IICT)   
Indian Institute of Chemical Biology (IICB)   
Central Institute of Medicinal and Aromatic Plants   
•   In  - house R & D centers of leading private sector drugs companies   
•   Contract Research Organizations primarily in the private sector.   
The Intellectual Property  
Rights Regime  
  
The Trips compliant  
India  n Patents Act 2005  
Manufacturing Sector   
•   Public (5 nos) and private sector enterprises (about 5000)   
•   Affiliates of MNCs  
  
 
the policy that explicitly deals with the promotion of innovation. The major policy 
initiatives in this area are summarized below:  
 
i. Promotion of pharmaceutical R&D through the provision of fiscal incentives;  
ii. Promotion of R&D intensive companies;  
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iii. Establishment of a pharmaceutical Research and Development Support fund 
(PRDSF); and 
iv. Development of orphaned drugs 
 
In the following I discuss the details of each of these four policy initiatives.  
 
i. Fiscal incentives for R&D: a) The benefit of 150 per cent weighted exemption (under 
section 35{2AB} of the Income Tax Act of 1961)4 is to be continued till 31st March, 
2015; b) This deduction is to be extended to depreciation on investment made in land and 
building for dedicated research facilities, expenditure incurred for obtaining regulatory 
approvals and filling of patents abroad and expenditure incurred on clinical trials in India; 
c) Reference Standard (sample under test) would be exempted from import duty; d) 
Reference books to be imported for R&D would be exempt d from import duty; and e) 
Presently there are 101 specified instruments (list 28) required for R&D purposes, which 
are exempt from import duty. With the ever-changing requirements new instruments are 
required to be imported. These instruments based on the certification of DSIR would also 
be exempt from import duty. The fiscal incentives are t present only available up to 31st 
March 2007. Since R&D activity has to be carried over long periods of time, fiscal 
incentives would be granted over a longer period of time extending up to 10 years i.e., up 
to 31st March 2015.  
 
ii.  R&D Intensive Companies (Gold Standard Companies): The Pharmaceutical 
Research and Development Committee headed by Dr R AMashelkar in its report 
submitted to Government in November, 1999 recommended that R&D intensive 
companies fulfilling certain conditions should be given price benefits for the drugs under 
Drug Price Control Order (DPCO). It specified certain norms in this regard and termed 
these as the gold standards. Since six years have el psed since this report was submitted it 
has been considered proper to revise these norms. The revised norms are as under: a) 
Invest at least 3 per cent of the annual sales turnover on R&D or Rs 500 million per 
annum, (average of last 3 years) whichever is higher on research facilities. b) 
Employment of at least 200 scientists in India (MScs or PhDs employed at least for one 
year). c) Own and operate manufacturing facilities in India which have been approved by 
at least two reputed foreign regulatory agencies (US, Europe, Japan, Canada, Australia, 
Israel, South Africa etc) d) Have filed at least 10 patent applications in India based on 
research done in India Companies fulfilling the above norms would be eligible for the 
benefit of 200% weighted deduction under 35(2AB) till 31st March, 2015 Additional 
incentives under price control measures may also be considered to such companies by 
Department of Chemicals and Petrochemicals. 
 
                                                





iii. The Pharmaceutical Research and Development Support Fund : At present, the 
Pharmaceutical Research and Development Support Fund (PRDSF) has a corpus of Rs. 
1500 million (where only interest income is available for spending) is utilized for funding 
R&D projects of research institutions and industry in the country. It is not adequate to 
meet the present day and the emerging requirements of this sector and there needs to be 
sufficiently augmented over the next five years. It has been decided to convert it into an 
annual grant of Rs. 1500 million, and thereafter it would be suitably increased further in a 
phased manner over a period of next five years. Priority would be given for R&D in case 
of diseases which are endemic to India like malaria, tuberculosis, hepatitis-B,leishmania 
(kala-azar),HIV/AIDS etc.  
 
iv. Development of orphaned drugs: The Central Drug Research Institute (CDRI) has 
over time developed a number of drug technologies, which could not be commercially 
produced and marketed. Efforts will be made to identify such technologies with a view to 
enabling them to reach the market.  
 
Further, the following two initiatives implied in the new draft policy has also further 
implications for promotion of innovation in the industry. They are: (i) abolition of 
industrial licensing for bulk drugs, intermediates and formulations; and (ii) automatic 
approval for foreign technology agreements through RBI.  
 
(b) The Patent regime: It is now fairly well accepted that it is the provisions of the 
Indian Patents Act of 1970, and especially the factthis Act did not recognize product 
patents but only process patents, that allowed Indian pharmaceutical companies to reverse 
engineer and manufacture at significantly lower costs. But with the country becoming a 
member of the WTO in 1995, the patent regime has been made TRIPs compliant. This 
TRIPS compliance in very specific terms have led to the introduction of the following set 
of measures; 
 
-The EMR (Exclusive Marketing Rights) provision was introduced with retrospective 
effect from January 1, 1995 (self-expunging provision which will be void on January 1, 
2005) 
 
-This transitional arrangement entailed India to prvide for a mailbox mechanism for 
accepting product patent applications and for examining and granting EMRs till the time 
it accords recognition to product patents; 
 
-Minimum patent term increased from 14 to 20 years 
 
-Reversal of burden of proof from patent holder to alleged infringer 
 
-The provisions relating to compulsory licensing have been modified to suit the public 
health requirements and also to comply with TRIPS. 
 
-Introduction of product patents relating to Chemicals, Drugs,  
Medicines and Food Products 
 8 
 
-Provision for pre-grant objection to patents has been diluted; and  
 
-Grace period in case of publication of inventions;  
 
The potential effect of these amendments on the innovative behaviour of the domestic 
industry is now hotly debated. One of the most important consequences is about the 
availability and prices of many essential drugs. Henceforth some of these drugs can only 
be manufactured under an explicit licence. According to Ramani, Pradhan and Ravi 
(2005), the Indian pharmaceutical firms have three choices open to them in a post TRIPS 
compliant regime. These are:  
 
i. They can focus on products that are either off patent (essentially the generics market);  
 
ii. They can collaborate with Western MNCs and biotech companies (two areas that are 
likely to witness an increase in collaborations areclinical trials and R&D outsourcing) 
and; 
 
ii. They can focus on innovations that the MNCs will not be interested in; that is mainly 
‘tropical’ or developing world diseases.  
 
Although a bit too early to clearly measure whether the three possibilities are actually 
happening, there is enough evidence to show that (i) nd (ii) are indeed happening. We 
will discuss this in some more detail in the subsequent sections. In the present we 
analyse, albeit briefly, the efforts undertaken by Indian pharmaceutical companies 
towards R&D in neglected but tropical diseases. This discussion is very largely based on 
Chaudhuri (2005).  
 
The Indian private sector started investing in R&D for developing new drugs since the 
mid 1990s when TRIPS came into effect. According to current estimates there about 15 
domestic pharmaceutical companies that are active in drug research and they have or are 
in the process of establishing new research centres with new drug discovery research 
(NDDR) as the major objective. The total R&D expenditure for the development of new 
drugs by Indian companies has increased from Rs 6.73 billion in 2002-03 to Rs 10.02 
billion in 2003-04 and a number of new chemical entities (NCEs) have been developed 
which is at different stages of development. Since they do not have all the skills or the 
financial wherewithal required to engage in the entir  process of drug development, they 
have adopted a strategy to develop new molecules and license out the molecules to the 
MNCs at early stages of clinical development. Consequent to this the Indian companies 
are effectively not targeting neglected diseases, but only those, which interest the MNCs. 
At this point, it is necessary to mention that the government has taken some initiatives for 
collaborative research to synergise the strengths of publicly funded R&D institutions and 
the Indian pharmaceutical industry. The only one ara where some progress has been 
made is in the development of an anti-TB molecule (Lupin’s development of the NCE LL 
4858 is a case in point). However no special efforts have been made for the development 
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of new drugs for most of the neglected diseases (such as malaria, HIV/AIDS, Chagas 
disease, Dengue fever, Leishmaniasis and Leprosy).  
 
(c) Price regulations: Drug prices in India are among the lowest in the world (and 
imports are therefore negligible). This is because of several reasons. The first is that only 
product patents and not process patents (for pharmaceuticals) are so far recognized under 
Indian law. Therefore Indian manufacturers can make bulk drugs and formulations by 
“reverse engineering” of the overseas patented medicines, reducing R&D expenses and 
also avoiding royalty payments. Further, Indian labour costs are low compared to 
overseas levels. India also has a large pool of technical and managerial personnel and 
does not need management skills from overseas. Most of the plant and equipment 
required is made locally. Most importantly a measure of statutory price control for bulk 
drugs and formulations operates in India. Certain drugs (known as scheduled drugs, as 
they are listed in the First Schedule to the Drug Price Contol Oder (DPCO). The DPCO 
was introduced in 1970, but has since been modified three times, the latest one being in 
1995. Over time the number of drugs under price control has been significantly reduced 
from 370 in 1979 to just about 25 in 2005.    Non-scheduled drugs can be priced freely, 
subject to some restrictions. The National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA) 
administers the price control regime5. The Government can exempt certain products from 
price control if they are new drugs discovered in India or bulk drugs produced from the 
basic stage by a new process discovered in India or drugs manufactured by small-scale 
industries (capital investment below a certain level) and sold under their own brand 
names. The most important problem with respect to price monitoring is the absence of an 
appropriate price index. The government has been depending on IMS Health-AC Nielsen, 
(formerly ORG) for tracking data on retail sales both in volume and value terms. 
Therefore, having a pharmaceutical price index on the lines of the Consumer Price Index 
or Wholesale Price Index is being considered. Thoug details of the proposed index were 
not available, it is said that the government could create an index by having a basket of 
drugs whose prices would be benchmarked to a base year. It could then monitor any 
changes in their prices in relation to the index. However, the therapeutic segments that 
would form the basket would have to be decided. Also, whether the index would monitor 
prices of only generic drugs or include patented drugs as well would also have to be 
finalised.  
 
(d) Product and quality regulations: The Drugs and Cosmetics Act of 1940 and its 
subordinate legislation Drugs and Cosmetics Rules (DCR), 1945 govern this aspect.   The 
conduct of clinical trials- a growing area of importance is actually governed by this 
legislation. The government has decided to amend the DCR and has emphasised the 
incorporation of Good Clinical Practices (GCP) protocols and to make it legally binding 
to stress on the safety aspect of the patients and strict accordance to ethics. Towards this 
                                                
5 The functions of the NPPA, inter alia, are to: (i) implement and enforce the provisions of the Drugs 
(Prices Control) Order in accordance with the powers delegated to it; (ii) monitor the availability ofdrugs, 
identify shortages, if any, and to take remedial step ; and  (iii) collect/ maintain data on production, exports 




direction the Department of Science and Technology (Government of India) established 
national Good Laboratory Practices (GLP) Compliance Monitoring Authority, with the 
approval of the Union Cabinet on April 24, 2002. GLP-compliance certification is 
voluntary in nature. The GLP in India are compliant with OECD norms and principles. 
Industries/test/ facilities/laboratories looking for approval from regulatory authorities 
before marketing them may apply to the National GLP Compliance Monitoring Authority 
for obtaining GLP Certification. So far there are only five Indian laboratories that have 
received this certification (Table 2).  
 




Test facility Areas of expertise Year of 
recognitio
n 





  Toxicity studies 
  Mutagenicity studies 
Environmental toxicity studies on 
aquatic & terrestrial organisms 
Studies on behavior in water, soil and 
air; bioaccumulation 
Residue studies 
Studies on effects on mesocosms and 
natural ecosystems 
Analytical and clinical chemistry 
testing 










Mutagenicity   Studies 
Analytical and Clinical Chemistry 
Testing 
2004 
3 Jai Research Foundation Physical-chemical Testing 
Toxicity Studies 
Mutagenicity Studies 
Environmental Toxicity Studies on 
Aquatic and Terrestrial Organisms 
Studies on Behaviour in Water, Soil 
and Air; Bioaccumulation 
Residue Studies 
Studies on Effects on Mesocosms and 
Natural Ecosystems 
Analytical and Clinical Chemistry 
Testing 
2004 
4 Orchid Chemicals and Physical-chemical Testing 2005 
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Analytical and Clinical Chemistry 
Testing 
5 Advinus Therapeutics 
Private Limited 
Physical-chemical Testing  
Toxicity studies  
Residue studies  
Mutagenicity Studies  
Analytical and Clinical Chemistry 
Testing  
Environmental toxicity studies on 
aquatic & terrestrial organisms 
2005 




(iii) The manufacturing enterprises  
 
There has been confusion on the total number of pharmaceutical units in the country. 
This has been variously estimated to be about 19, 203 licensees. Citing the arguments and 
data provided in the Mashelkar Committee on drug regulatory issues, Chaudhuri (2005) 
argues that there are about 5877 pharmaceutical units in the country. This is because the 
number of pharmaceutical companies would be less than t e number of licensees because 
manufacturing licenses are given to specific units and many companies have multiple 
manufacturing units. The structure of the drugs manuf cturing sector in India is presented 
in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Structure of India’s Pharmaceutical Industry 
 
Type of enterprise Number of enterprises  
1. Bulk drugs  1333 
2. Formulations 4354 
3. Large Volume Parenterals  134 
4. Vaccines 56 
Total  5877 
Source: Mashelkar Committee (2003), p. 49 
 
According to Chaudhuri (2005), the bulks drug industry resembles that of a perfectly 
competitive industry with no one firm accounting for a significant share. Most of the 
units in this sector belong to the small-scale sector. Large private sector companies, on 
the contrary, dominate the formulations industry. See Table 4.  
 
One of the most important features of the industry is the fact that it is largely dominated 
by domestic private sector enterprises. In fact there are only five MNCs in the top 20 and 
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not a single public sector enterprise figure in the list. The two public sector enterprises, 
Hindustan Antibiotics established in 1954 and the Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals 
established in 1961, played an important role in creating a domestic private sector 
pharmaceutical industry (Chaudhuri, 2005, p. 34). This is best summed up by Smith 
(2000, p 33).  
 
“Before HAL opened its doors, the domestic pharmaceuti al industry was all but 
nonexistent. Furthermore, India’s universities had no provisions for the type of 
specialized training required by pharmaceutical companies. HAL’s founders took the 
initiative and laid a considerable part of the foundation that supports today’s local and 
MNC subsidiary drug companies. HAL created a demand for inputs in the form of skilled 
labor, specialized capital, and relevant services, and provided the critical mass for local 
pharmaceutical production, created jobs for tens of th usands, spurred innovation, and 
sparked industrial development in up and downstream businesses. These contributions 
eventually rendered India a favorable environment for pharmaceutical production, 
research, and distribution”. 
 
Table 4: Top twenty companies in the retail pharmaceutical market in India, 2004 
 
Source: Chaudhuri (2005), p. 17.  
 
However currently both these units are declared as “sick” or financially distressed 
companies by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) and are 
practically non-existent.  
 
The amended patent law (1972) and the policy of positive discrimination towards 
indigenous companies vis-à-vis MNCs ensured that domestic companies currently (2004) 
account for nearly three quarters of the pharmaceutical market (Figure 2).  
 
Rank Sector Company No : of products Annual sale in Rs Million Market share (%) 2004
1 Indian Cipla 707 11285 5.51
2 MNC Glaxo Smith Kline 205 11143 5.44
3 Indian Ranbaxy 437 9190 4.48
4 Indian Nicholas Piramal 449 8720 4.25
5 Indian Sun Pharma 350 6738 3.29
6 Indian Dr Reddy's 183 4988 2.43
7 Indian Zydus-Cadila 330 4959 2.42
8 Indian Aristo Pharma 175 4760 2.32
9 MNC Abott India 87 4735 2.31
10 Indian Alkem Labs 310 4477 2.18
11 MNC Aventis 44 4367 2.13
12 Indian Lupin 274 4165 2.03
13 Indian Micro Labs 461 3903 1.9
14 Indian Wockhardt 238 3776 1.84
15 Indian Torrent 150 3747 1.83
16 Indian Novartis India 127 3725 1.82
17 Indian Alembic 169 3432 1.67
18 Indian Unichem Labs 189 3430 1.67
19 Indian USV 86 3390 1.65
20 MNC Pfizer 29 3274 1.6
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Although the data on market shares provided in Table 4 appears to give an indication that 
the market is fairly competitive, this is really not the case. The reason being the 
pharmaceutical industry is not a homogenous one but fragmented into different 
therapeutic segments such as tranquilizers, analgesics, antibiotics, vitamins etc. Each of  
 
Figure 2: Market shares of Foreign and Indian Companies in the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry, 1952-2004 
Source: Chaudhuri (2005), p. 18 
 
these segments is a not substitute for each other. In fact the concentration ratios are much 
higher within a specific therapeutic group. For insta ce, Chaudhuri (2005) shows that, if 
one takes the various sub groups within antibiotics, he degree of concentration is much 
higher. 
 
Another important structural aspect has been the increased number of mergers and 
acquisitions in the industry. In the period from Janu ry 2004-when Ranbaxy formalized 
its purchase of RPG (Aventis) for $80 million, making it the fifth-largest generics 
supplier in France-until October 2005, Indian firms ade 18 international acquisitions 
(KPMG, 2006).  Glenmark, Jubilant Organosys, Nicholas Piramal and Ranbaxy each 
acquired two overseas businesses during this time, but the biggest Indian buy was Matrix 
Labs' acquisition of Belgium's Docpharma for $263 million in June 2005. It is generally 
held that the pharmaceutical enterprises are currently the most aggressive overseas 
investors of all Indian industries. Several reasons6 could be attributed to this mergers and 
acquisition spree. They are for the need to:   
 
                                                
6 See KPMG (2006), p.25 
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• Improve global competitiveness; 
• Move up the value chain; 
• Create and enter new markets; 
• Increase their product offering; 
• Acquire assets (including research and contract manufacturing firms, in order to 
further boost their outsourcing capabilities) and new products; and  
• Consolidate their market shares 
  
(iii) Government Research Institutes  
 
According to Chaudhuri (2005), of the total pharmaceutical R&D expended in the 
country, nearly two thirds is contributed by the industry and the remaining by the GRIs 
primarily under the management of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research 
(CSIR). Of the small number of new drugs that were developed by Indian inventors a 
lion’s share were the products of research done at the Central Drug Research Institute 
(CDRI). CDRI is considered to be one of the few public sector organizations in the 
world, which have its own drug development infrastruc ure. Over the years it has 
developed and licensed to other private sector enterpris s ten new drugs. Unfortunately 
most of the drugs according to Chaudhuri (2005) did not survive in the market owing to 
strong competition from MNCs.  
 
Apart from the CDRI, which is directly connected with drug research, the CSIR system 
has 20 other laboratories that are engaged in some f rm of pharmaceutical research or 
other. Annexure 1 lists these labs with their areas of competence. Four of these led by the 
CDRI have been very active in drug research as indicated by the fact that they together 
account for a quarter of both Indian and foreign patents secured by the CSIR system 
(Table 5).   
 
Table 5: Foreign and Indian patents granted to CSIR Labs engaged in drugs 
research, 2003-04 
 
  India Foreign 
CDRI 7 5 
CIMAP 7 29 
IICB 4 5 
IICT 24 39 
Total for the above 42 78 
Total for CSIR 275 212 




















































Figure 3: Sectoral system of innovation of the Indian telecommunications equipment 
industry (c2003)  
Source: Own compilation 
Policy and strategic direction 
• Managed by the Department of Telecommunications (DOT) within the 
Ministry of Communication and Information Technology. Governed by the 
National Telecoms Policy of 1999- wants to make India a major 
manufacturing base for telecom equipments. Telecom C mission and the 
DOT are responsible for policy formulation, licensing, wireless spectrum 
management, administrative monitoring of public sector enterprises. 
• Regulated by the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of India 
(TRAI) 
• Disputes settlement: Telecom Dispute Settlement and Apellate Tribunal 
(TDSAT) is to adjudicate any dispute between licensor and a licensee, 
between two or more service providers, between a provider and a group of 
consumers, and to hear and dispose of appeals against any decision or orders 
of TRAI.  
Structure of the Research Segment 
 
• Centre for Development of 
Telematics (C-DOT) 
• Telecommunication Engineering 
Centre (TEC) 
• Indian Institute of Technology-
Madras 
• In-house R&D Centres of ITI and 
Hindustan Cables 
• Contract Research Organisations, 
who does R&D outsourcing deals for 
MNCs like Wipro Technologies 
• Telecom software manufacturing 
Structure of the equipment-
manufacturing segment 
• A total of nearly 150 large, small 
and medium domestic and foreign 
companies 
• State-owned undertaking such as 
ITI. Hindustan Cables 
• Private sector C-DOT technology 
licensees 
• Affiliates of MNCs: Alcatel, 
Ericsson, Fujitsu, Huawei, Lucent, 
Motorola, NEC, Nokia, Nortel 
Networks, Qualcomm, Siemens, 
Structure of the telecom service providers 
 
Continues to be largely under state-
ownership  
 
• Fixed telephones: 91 per cent of the 
fixed lines are still under the public 
sector entities, BSNL and MTNL. but 
the share of private sector has been 
increasing,  
• Mobile telephony:  is largely in the 
private sector, but the share of the 
public sector enterprise has been 




The SSI of the telecom equipment industry is mapped out in Figure 3. On the whole, 
India's sectoral system of innovation of the telecom equipment industry  is very weak and 
fragmented. While the research segment, especially the dedicated public laboratory C-
DOT, is very strong in terms of its capability to dsuccessful R&D projects, there have 
been several attempts in the past to weaken its functioning (Mani 1995 and 2007, 
forthcoming). Compared to the Chinese one, the strategic direction from the state has 
been virtually absent7. Given the fact that the country was demonstrating a rowing 
capability in computer software efforts should have be n made to have a strong presence 
in telecoms software. This was, of course, accomplished subsequently in some measure 
by the private sector enterprises but with little or n  state support;  
 
The most distinguishing aspect of India’s sectoral system for innovation is the central 
role that it assigned to the public laboratory, C-DOT. While the lab was successful in not 
just generating technologies that were quite suited to Indian conditions, it was able to 
effectively transfer the generated technology to a host of public and private sector 
enterprises. At the very same time it assiduously built up a growing number of 
component suppliers. In short, the laboratory is credited with establishing a modern 
telecommunications equipment industry in the country (Mani, 2007 forthcoming);  
 
The drawback of this strategy was that the firms did not have their own in-house R&D 
centres and were dependent entirely on the technologies that they received from the 
public laboratory. The lab, as mentioned earlier, continued to focus on fixed telephony 
and that too on circuit switching technology, when packet switching was becoming the 
state-of-the-art. Further, it failed to take cogniza ce of the future in mobile 
communications (just like its counterpart in Brazil, the CPqD, but unlike its Korean 
counterpart, the ETRI8). The net result is that the licensing firms have become too 
complacent with respect to their own capability building. This is unlikely the Chinese 
strategy where the firms have built up considerable innovation capability on their own 
through their in-house R&D centres and have in addition acquired considerable 
production and marketing capabilities and has within a short span pf about 10 years 
emerged as internationally competitive; 
 
During the period up to and including the 1990s, domestic Indian companies dominated 
India’s telecom equipment industry. For instance, dspite having a public technology 
procurement policy, which did not favour domestic equipment manufacturers, the share 
of indigenously designed and manufactured equipments accounted for over 50 per cent of 
market (Mani, 2007 forthcoming). However the country just did not have a strategy in 
place to make its leading state-owned equipment manufacturer, ITI, a national champion 
                                                
7 The TIFAC did a major technology foresight exercise covering nearly 17 different areas including the 
telecommunications sector. Known as the 'Vision 2020' reports, these were published in 1996. Going 
through the list of seven major recommendations of the report on telecommunications one finds that the 
study did not anticipate at all the phenomenal growth of mobile telecommunications in the country.  
 
8 Mani (2007, forthcoming) has the details. 
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in sharp contrast to the strategy pursued by the Chinese. This will be evident when one 
makes a comparison of two leading telecommunications equipment manufacturers from 
China and India   despite being an early starter, on every single indicator; the leading 
Chinese firm outperforms the leading Indian firm;    
 
India has been a recipient of substantial FDI in telecommunications, although much of it 
is in the distribution of mobile communications services. Many MNCs including two of 
the leading Chinese telecom equipment manufacturers, Huawei and ZTE have established 
or are in the process of establishing manufacturing ventures in the country. The 
Department of Telecommunications (DoT) has set a targe  of attracting about $ 800 
million in foreign direct investments in telecom manufacturing by March 2006. 
Cumulatively over the period 1991 through 2004, thecountry has attracted FDI in 
telecommunications to the tune of US $ 7.14 billion and this works out to about 18 per 
cent of the total approved FDI the country has receiv d as a whole.   As a result of these 
high foreign investments, the complexion of India’s telecom equipment industry is fast 
undergoing a change with foreign affiliates and imports accounting or going to account 
for a significant share of the domestic market for telecom equipments.  
 
In fact a recent study by the Department of Telecommunications (2004) found that 
currently (c2004) most of the domestic telecom equipment manufacturers and even the 
state-owned undertaking, ITI which till recently was the major equipment manufacturer, 
have merely become “trader” by importing the equipment and supplying it to the service 
providers9.  The deregulation of India's telecom equipment industry had an extremely 
destablising effect on the operations of ITI (Subramanian, 2004) and its very existence 
was now in danger10.   
 
An important development in the country’s sectoral system of innovation is the growth of 
R&D outsourcing deals between foreign MNCs and India  contract research 
organizations in the area of telecom R&D. As this is a growing phenomenon, there are no 
precise estimates11.  Even C-DOT, the nerve centre of the sector's innovation system, has 
                                                
 
9 The study even states that ‘in order to take advantage of lower customs duty, a separate procedure of 
“high –sea sale” is being followed. Even reservation quotas of PSUs are being used for trading goods 
manufactured abroad and without any commitment of transfer of technology”. See Department of 
Telecommunications (2004), p. 4.   
 
10  Recently the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has sanctioned Rs 10.32 billion for the revival ITI and IT 
has entered into a technical tie-up with Alcatel for manufacture of three million telephone lines. An 
announcement to this effect was made in the upper house of Indian parliament on March 24, 2005. See 
Economic Times, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/106839.cms (accessed on 
27/09/2006). Further recent press reports indicate that the company is going to take up the production of 
mobile communications equipments under foreign technology licensing.  
 
11 According to one of the leading consultancy organiz tions the R&D outsourcing market for IT in India is 
estimated to grow more than $8 billion by 2010 from $1.3 billion in 2003, at a CAGR of 30 per cent. There 
have been a number of high profile R&D outsourcing deals between Western MNCs and Indian enterprises, 
for instance the WIPRO-Ericsson deal, the Sasken-Nortel deal are two of three high profile deals in this 
area. .  
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recently entered into a contractual agreement with Alcatel to set up a global R&D centre 
for broadband wireless products12.  
 
I consider in some detail the three major components of he innovation system, namely (i) 
Public policy support; (ii) Manufacturing enterprises; and (iii) Government Research 
Institutes.  
 
(i) Public policy support: The most important instrument of public policy support that 
was unique to this industry was public technology procurement. The government could 
practice this during th 1980s and even up to the early 1990s because the main consumer, 
the main telecom service provider, the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) and 
later on its corporatised version, the  BSNL too was a state-owned undertaking. However 
in the latter half of the 1990s, the deregulation of the telecom seice provision market and 
the emergence of mobile communication has reduced state’  ability to support domestic 
technology generation through public technology support.  
 
However in during the best of times, the way the public technology support was actually 
practiced was not very beneficial to domestically developed technology by the public 
laboratory. This could be explained as follows.    
 
The DoT purchases switching equipments only from local manufacturers and does not 
allow imports of finished switching products13. This really does not afford any protection 
to domestically assembled switches, but in fact quie the contrary. There are two types of 
evidences for this. First, imported equipments attrac  a customs duty of 15 per cent ad 
valorem(2002-03). At the same time the imported comp nents for domestically 
assembled switches also attract customs duties and given the nearly fifty per cent import 
content of domestically assembled switches, the procurement policy does not afford any 
specific protection to domestically assembled or manuf ctured switches. Second, as noted 
earlier in Figure 4.8, the fall in price realisation f domestically manufactured equipments 
signal increased competitive pressures.  Further in the past the rate of rejection of 
indigenously manufactured switching equipments by the DoT has been as high as 25 per 
cent in the early 1980s14.  
 
It has a decentalised telecom switches procurement policy. In order to simplify the 
procurement process, the department receives tenders and sets a fixed rate through a 
                                                
12 The project is to develop WiMAX (Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access) broadband 
technology. WiMax is a lot like WiFi, the short-range wireless technology that allows Web surfers to 
connect to the Internet at so-called hot spots. But unlike WiFi's 50-metre range, WiMax has a reach of one 
to 10 miles, offering a way to bring the Internet to entire communities without having to invest billions of 
dollars to install phone or cable networks. 
 
13 It must of course be added that the new private enrants are not governed by this stipulation and are fre  
to import switching equipments.  
 
14 See Mani (1992), p. 97. 
 
 19 
tendering process commonly known as "rate contract"15 after which the Chief General 
Managers of the various telecom circles are authorized to purchase their requirements 
from approved vendors.  The Telecommunications Engineering Centre (TEC) within the 
department sets the technical standards of all telecom products including switches.  
Thirty per cent of the total requirements of switching equipments are reserved for the 
public sector enterprise. However the price at which this thirty per cent is procured is at 
the lowest price quotation received for the remaining seventy per cent for which an open 
tender is invited. This reservation price is referred to as the L1 price. It is thus seen that 
the public sector producer of switching equipments have actually to bid for thirty per cent 
of the switching requirements without actually knowing the price at which the bid is 
going to be made. Thus it is clear that the public procurement process followed in the 
case of switching equipments does not afford any protection to the public sector 
producer, which in this case is ITI Ltd at Bangalore.   The price-performance ratio is thus 
the main criteria for selection and not other non-technical considerations such as deferred 
credit facilities.  At least for some more years, given the near monopoly position of the 
government carriers) public procurement policy will be an effective instrument for 
stimulating local R&D activities. However with the growth of private service providers 
this will be less effective, especially when the private sector providers, who are in the 
initial years of establishment, would also tale into account deferred credit facilities which 
only the MNC vendors can offer. 
 
(ii) Government Research Institute   
The government research institute, Centre for Development of Telematics (C-DOT), 
occupies the core of the SSI of the industry. C-DOT was established as a stand-alone 
public R&D organisation by the central government in 1984. It was charged with the 
responsibility of developing a family of digital switching systems that were suitable to 
the Indian usage pattern and conditions. Its scope has now been broadened to include 
transmission and access products as well. Over time, C-DOT has developed a wide range 
of switching and transmission products both for the rural and urban applications. It is 
claimed that while the C-DOT main exchange can alsofunction as Mobile Switching 
Centre for GSM Cellular Service, the Small Rural Automatic exchanges developed for 
rural environment can work without air-conditioning.  They come complete with SS7 
Intelligent Network signaling systems16. In addition ISDN facilities are also available; 
what is unique is that these switches have been designed to operate without air- 
conditioning in harsh environments. About 45,000 exchanges totalling about 23 million 
telephone lines have been installed in India (As on December 31, 2001). This means that 
approximately 50 per cent of the equipped capacity in the country is based on C-DOT 
designed switches.  Exports in bulk have been to about 22 countries such as Vietnam, 
Bangladesh, Nepal, Ethiopia, Nepal, Ghana, and Uganda.   And this systematic vendor 
development shows that there have been considerable technology spillovers to 
                                                
15 The DoT receives and evaluates bids from domestic firms (including affiliates of MNCs) and awards rate 
contracts based on price and performance.  
 
16 These are the systems that are used to find out if a number is busy or available and involve a separate 
system that checks up the data bases of phone numbers ; also they provide toll-free services; in this way a 
the main telephone network does not get overloaded ; these systems are also used to interconnect Mobile 
and land based telephone numbers.  
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downstream industries as well. It has a R & D centre in Bangalore with complete test 
equipments such as , microprocessor development systems, CASE Tools, Object- 
Oriented methodologies, software metrics, along with V5.1, V 5.2 interface, SS7 
signaling systems complete with the SSP, SCP and SMP systems. In fact C-DOT with a 
total manpower of 1300 employees has one of the fast st development cycle for digital 
switching systems any where in the world (Mani, 1995). C-DOT also claims to be having 
retrofitting capabilities- that is it has the capability to redesign some of the older switches 
that it has already developed and is currently being used in the network comply with 
more recent technological changes. This is achieved by making the necessary software 
changes. I have of course been not able to secure an independent confirmation of this 
capability.   
 
I now turn my attention to measure quantitatively the innovation capability of C-DOT. 
Towards this direction, I consider two separate indicators of this capability. First is a 
summary measure of innovation capability based on production of C-DOT designed 
switches..  Second is a series of evidences to show the spillover effects of the 
technologies developed at C-DOT.    
 
Indicator of innovation capability 
There are two variants of this index. The first variant of this index is based on the relative 
market share of domestically designed (namely C-DOT designed and ITI-manufactured 
Main Automatic Local Exchanges (in terms of number of lines)) and foreign-designed 
but domestically manufactured (namely Alcatel-designed and ITI manufactured).17 On 
technical grounds, both the technologies are considered to be equal. In very specific 
terms the index is defined as follows: 
 
Index of innovation capability  = Production of C-DOT designed exchanges at  ITI       
*100                           
                                     Production of Alcatel-designed OCB-283 exchanges at ITI 
 
                                                
 
17 Currently the Indian telecoms carrier industry employs eight different types of switching technologies 
like C-DOT, E-10B and OCB-283 (Alcatel), 5ESS (Lucent technologies), EWSD (Siemens), FETEX-150L 
(Fujitsu) and NEAX 61E(NEC). Of all these 8 technologies, C-DOT is the single largest with a market 
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Figure 4: Index of innovation capability in Switching Equipments, 1995-2001 
Source: ITI (various issues) 
 
If the index is greater than 100 and increasing over time, one can say that the innovation 
capability of the domestic research sector is increasing over time. A major limitation of 
the index is that it is rather difficult to interpret short-term movements in the index. A 
second limitation is the fact that the index is defin d in terms of production figures, and 
not in terms of number of working connections. But I argue that this will only affect the 
level of the index and not its direction of movement. This is because the share of C-DOT 
designed exchanges have been rising over time Based on the data during the period 1995 
through 2001, the index has been computed and it is pre ented in Figure 4. Excepting for 
the initial year, the index shows that it has been showing a continuous rise over time 
implying a rising capability. This is quite significant as this has been happening at a time 
when the industry was going through a flux: the carrier industry was getting deregulated 
and MNCs were entering the equipment industry. So despite these factors, which can 
militate against the usage of domestically designed switches, one sees a systematic and 
continuous increase in its market share. As seen before this could be largely explained by 
the public procurement policy of the main consumer, the DoT.  
 
The second variant is based on the number of lines of a switching technology actually 
commissioned within the network of the two main public telecoms service providers, 
namely within the DoT and the MTNL networks during a year. This variant is thus more 
of an index of market share of the various technologies and it is measured by the share of 
C-DOT designed switches in the total number of lines commissioned each year (Table 6). 
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This variant thus captures the effect of liberalization. In fact the index shows that despite 
public technology procurement, the share of C-DOT designed switches have 
continuously fallen all through the period. This of c urse proves that public technology 
procurement in the Indian does not afford any protection to domestically designed 
switches. This proposition could be further explained as follows.   
 
Table 6: Share of C-DOT designed switches in the total number of lines 




1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97
1. AXE-10 74000 169704 128300 113060
2. EWSD 107000 203500 297328 249544
3. 5ESS 10000 4000 132000 40648
4. FETEX-150 160000 93000 113200 93280
5. NEAX-61 Nil 10000 Nil Nil
6. E-10B 766327 957330 1119994 523854




































44.68 40.67 33.80 30.46
 
Notes: * Small and medium exchanges are those having up to 3000 lines; ** Large 
exchanges are those between 3000 and 10, 000; and *** Extra large are those having 
more than 10, 000 lines.   
 
Source: Rajya Sabha, Unstarred Question No: 1171,  
http://164.100.24.219/rsq/quest.asp?qref=32199 (accessed on 26/09/2006) 
  
(i) The Table tracks only the share of foreign and domestic technologies in the total 
annual flow of exchange lines commissioned. C-DOT's share in the total stock of 
exchange lines in the country is high at about 50 per cent with remaining 50 per 
cent shared by the other eight technologies;  
(ii)  C-DOT is specialising in small and medium exchanges, while the imported 
technologies are used essentially in large and extra large exchanges. It also a fact 
that C-DOT's capability is largely in small and medium exchanges, though it also 
has claims of capabilities in designing large and extra large switches; 
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(iii)  It is also clear from an answer to an unstarred question in the upper house of the 
Indian parliament that the DoT procured almost five times the tendered quantity 
of switching equipments during the same period, supposedly for modernising the 
network with ISDN facility18. But the number of subscribers using ISDN in the 
whole country was just 30919. So it is clear that DoT  appears to have purchased 
these 'overspecified ' equipments far in excess of its actual requirement and this 
'excess purchase' appears to have  eroded the market shar  of C-DOT;  
(iv) Further the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (2000) found number of 
other irregularities with this tendering process. For instance, although the 
suppliers imported most of the components of theese switching equipments, DoT 
assumed import content as low as 23 per cent while working out reduction on 
rates on account of fall in customs duty in 1995-96 budget. This inaccurate 
assumption by DoT led to excess payment of Rs 405 million to the suppliers with 
corresponding loss to the government exchequer. DoTalso had to make an 
avoidable expenditure of Rs 639 million in the procurement of these exchanges 
against 1997-99 tender due to failure of the Tender Evaluation Committee (TEC) 
to submit its report within the bid validity period. TEC took 190 days in 
finalisation of its report against the prescribed limit of 42 days; and  
(v) Despite this fall in market share, C-DOT designed switches continue to occupy 
the single largest share. 
(vi) In the light of the above comments, it would not be correct to interpret the fall in 
the overall market share of C-DOT designed switches to mean a fall in its 
innovation capability.  
 
Spillover effects of C-DOT  
 
Over the last two decades of its existence, C-DOT has made a number of important 
contributions both in money and in giving a fillip to domestic technology development in 
this area of high technology. These could be enumerated as follows: 
(i) Since its inception in 1984, C-DOT has recouped approximately 25 per cent of the 
amount that its has received in the form of parliamentary grants through the sale of its 
generated technologies. This rate of self-generation has increased significantly to more 
than two thirds in the very recent past (Figure 8). This is a remarkable achievement as 
elsewhere in India, the network of laboratories coming under the purview of the Council 
of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) has reco d of generating only about 10 per 
cent of their total income through self generation (Mani, 2002).    
                                                
18 See Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No: 4125 , http://164.100.24.219/rsq/quest.asp?qref=21560 
(accessed on 27/09/06). According to the answer given by the Ministry of Communications, the DoT has 
actually ordered 0.91 million lines of digital switching equipments in response to a tender for just 0.2 
million lines.  
 
19 See response to the same question no: 4125.     From the same response it is also clear that the number  of 
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Figure 5: Ratio of self-generation through sale of technology to total parliamentary 
grants 
Source: C-DOT (Various issues) 
  
(ii) C-DOT 's technological innovations have contributed to a substantial reduction in the 
price of switching equipments sold in the country. In fact over the last one-decade prices 
have fallen by as much as 75 per cent. This fall in pr ces have enabled the country to 
increase the supply of direct exchange lines. 
(iii) C-DOT has transferred eight different types of technologies to very nearly 74 
manufacturers in the country (Table 7). These 74 companies have their own suppliers of 
components and spare parts numbering over 600 enterprises. C-DOT has thus effectively 
contributed to the creation of an indigenous telecommunications equipment industry in 
the country. More details of the industry are analysed in one of the subsequent sections. 
 
Table 7: Technology transfer by C-DOT (Completed technologies) 
Type of technology  Number of manufacturers 
256 P RAX 14 
SBM RAX 14 







Source: C-DOT (various issues) 
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(iii) C-DOT has pioneered the telecoms software industry in the country. Every year 
approximately 80 engineers (out of a total of about 1200) leave the centre. Since the 
development of modern digital switches is largely software based, this has given these 
engineers a strong background in the development of telecom software.  The growth of 
the telecoms software sector is analysed separately.  
 
While C-DOT has considerable capability in the design of fixed line switches, there is 
some doubt about its ability to design mobile switches. In fact my discussions at both the 
DoT, the TEC and with C-DOT revealed that C-DOT does not have, as of now, any real 
capability in the design of mobile switches. In fact no state agencies in India (including 
the Technology Information and Forecasting Assessment Council) has done a detailed 
technology foresight exercise for the telecoms sector so much to say that C-DOT , despite 
possessing the potential has been totally unprepared fo  this change over. This is going to 
be a serious shortcoming for C-DOT in the future, as the growth of mobile phones is 
likely to be faster than that of fixed lines. MNCs such as Lucent, Motorolla and Siemens 
have already established themselves as suppliers of state-of-the-art mobile switching 
centres to the cellular service providers. The problem is so severe that according the CEO 
of ITI Ltd (the largest telecoms equipment manufacturer in India), it had no orders for 
switching equipments for fixed lines from the largest telecom service provider in the 
country (namely BSNL) for the year 2003. Already there are reports of most of the 
licensees (switching equipment) of C-DOT having to close their manufacturing activities 
or scaling it down for lack of sufficient orders.  
 
(iii) The manufacturing enterprises 
There are about 150 enterprises of all sizes and ownership operating in the industry. They 
can be broadly divided into three: a large but financi lly distressed state-owned 
undertaking, ITI, a number of small and medium sized domestic private sector enterprises 
and a number of well known MNCs or their affiliates. The latter have entered the industry 
only during the period since 1985 when the manufactring of telecom equipments were 
opened up to private sector and indeed even foreign participation.  The equipment 
industry itself can broadly be classified into three: switching, transmission and terminal 
equipments. The switching equipment sector is largey dominated by the MNCs. The 
most distinguishing aspect of the manufacturing sector when compared to that of the 
pharmaceutical industry is that none of the domestic private sector manufacturers have 
any in-house research capability and the enterprises w re completely dependent on 
external sources of technology. This I believe is an important structural weakness of the 
industry’s SSI. This weakness is clearly reflected in the innovative performance of the 
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The pharmaceutical and telecom equipment industries are two high technology 
manufacturing industries that India has sought to promote. Once can easily discern a 
sectoral system of innovation in both the industrie although there are important 
differences between the SSI of both the industries. Table 8 summarises these important 
cobtrasts between the two SSIs.  
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Employing three standard indicators of innovativeness, one sees that the pharmaceutical 
industry is more successful. Our explanation for this difference was largely in terms of 
the constitution of the respective SSI. Thus the present study is yet another instance20 to 
show that a dichotomous relationship between research nd production is not very 
desirable for promoting innovations in the industrial sector.     
 
 
                                                
20 China’s innovation system was transformed all through the 1990s.  In 1988 the Torch Programme was 
launched to encourage something like spin-off enterprises—called NTEs (New Technology Enterprises), 
from existing R&D institutes and universities. Local governments contributed to investment in 
infrastructure and supporting institutions for the New and High-Tech Industry Zones that became 
incubation bases for the NTE-startups. Scientists and engineers, often with support from their parent 
institutions, went into commercial application of their inventions and expertise by means of the creation of 
NTEs. And by the early 1990s, reform policy included another solution to change individual R&D 
institutes into production entities. This, as well, was an adaptation to an actual evolution already realized by 
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